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THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO DEAL UNDER COLGATE:
DOCTRINE OR DELUSION
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Since 1919, the year when the famous Colgate' case was decided, both
the antitrust bar and the courts have talked about and relied on the so-
called "Colgate doctrine." This area of the law has been far from clear
and has probably created as much confusion in the field of antitrust law
as any other concept. It is the purpose of this comment to eliminate such
confusion by exposing this doctrine for what it really is. The Colgate de-
fense is truly no defense at all, but rather an ineffective smokescreen behind
which the antitrust defendant has sought to camouflage his allegedly con-
spiratorial or monopolistic devices. This comment then will demonstrate
how courts find the antitrust violation in spite of, and even because of, the
right to refuse to deal.
The problem started when an indictment was brought against the Col-
gate Co. which alleged:
[T]he defendant knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged
in a combination with said wholesale and retail dealers . .. for
the purpose and with the effect of procurring adherence on the
part of such dealers . . . to resale prices fixed by the defendant,
and of preventing such dealers from reselling such products at lower
prices, thus suppressing competition . . . in restraint of . . . trade
... in violation of the act ... to protect trade and commerce... . 2
Following the indictment a summary was given of methods used to carry
out the purposes of the combination. These included: distribution of uniform
price lists among the dealers, urging them to adhere to such prices and
stating that no sales would be made to those who did not adhere; requests
for information on non-adhering dealers; investigation and discovery of
those not adhering and placing their names on suspended lists; requests to
offending dealers for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices
and uniform refusals to sell to any who failed to give such assurance.
The district court dismissed the indictment and on appeal the Supreme
Court in affirming said:
Our problem is to ascertain, as accurately as may be, what inter-
pretation the trial court placed upon the indictment—not to inter-
pret it ourselves . . . [and] as interpreted below, the indictment
does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its products to
dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell
except at prices fixed by the company . 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court in essence merely held there was no violation of the antitrust
law since, as was found by the district court, the indictment did not allege
1 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
2 Id. at 302-03.
8 Id. at 306-07.
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an agreement to maintain resale prices. It is submitted that the sole issue
before the Court was whether the indictment alleged a violation of the anti-
trust laws, even though there was no agreement.
Unfortunately the opinion did not end here and in dicta the Court said:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.
And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances
under which he will refuse to sell!' (Emphasis supplied.)
It is submitted that this language created the confusing conclusion that the
Court had held that this general conduct under any interpretation was not
a violation of the antitrust law; and further, a refusal to deal to support
any of these price maintenance methods was not illegal. A careful reading
of the opinion would indicate that the Court did not even concern itself
with the summary of conduct, its holding was based solely on what it thought
the district court interpreted the indictment to mean.
The "Colgate doctrine" was born however, and to some it appeared that
immunity from the antitrust laws could be attained by using refusals to
deal to effectuate practices that were heretofore illegal. It is evident that
at least one court, in relying on Colgate, believed that an actual agreement
to maintain resale prices was now permissible. In United States v. A.
Schrader's Son, Inc.° the district court sustained a demurrer to an indict-
ment charging Schrader with making agreements to maintain resale prices.
In its opinion the Court referred to the Colgate case and said:
The tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers in the prices
thus fixed is the equivalent for all practical purposes of an express
agreement. . . . [I] t seems to me that it is a distinction without a
difference to say that he may do so by the subterfuges and devices
set forth in the [Colgate] opinion and not violate the Sherman
Anti-trust Act, yet if he had done the same thing in form of a
written agreement, adequate only to effectuate the same purpose, he
would be guilty of a violation of the law"
In reversing, the Supreme Court? in an opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds
referred to the Colgate case and emphasized that the Court in Colgate was
botmd by the Criminal Appeals Act to accept the district courts' interpre-
tation of the indictment and under that interpretation "the indictment failed
to charge that Colgate and Company made agreements, either express or
implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified resale
prices. . . ."8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court in concluding said:
4 Id. at 307.
5 264 Fed. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1919).
6 Id. at 183-84.
7 United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
8 Id. at 99.
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It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference between
the situation presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his
wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who
fail to observe them, and one where he enters into agreements—
whether express or implied from a course of dealing or other circum-
stances—with all customers throughout the different States which
undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices. In the first,
the manufacturer but exercises his independent discretion concern-
ing his customers and there is no contract or combination which
imposes any limitation on the purchaser. In the second, the parties
are combined through agreements designed to take away dealers'
control of their own affairs and thereby destroy competition and
restrain the free and natural flow of trade amongst the States.° (Em-
phasis supplied.)
The Schrader case merely held that price fixing agreements were illegal.
This of course had been the holding of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co. 1 ° and, as far as the Court was concerned, was not in conflict
with Colgate. The Schrader case was significant, however, since the Court in
an indirect manner discussed the problem of someone being able to circum-
vent the object of the antitrust laws without violating them. It is submitted
that the Court's language as quoted above, with respect to agreements,
namely, "whether express or implied from a course of dealing or other cir-
cumstances .. ."Ii (Emphasis supplied.) could very well have been an
implied warning to the bar that it would not tolerate attempts to avoid
the antitrust laws by using refusals to deal as a means of coercing buyers
into maintaining resale prices. It appears that the Court was saying it
would look beyond a refusal to deal and would imply, from the seller's
conduct, an agreement to maintain resale prices and then in that method
find a violation of the antitrust laws. Where the illegal conduct is found,
the right to refuse to deal will not otherwise exonerate it. Further, where
the illegal conduct or conspiracy has as its objective a perfected use of
the refusal to deal so as to enforce a restraint of trade, Colgate will not
prevent the courts from finding an antitrust violation.
This transparent quality of the "Colgate doctrine" became succintly
apparent in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. 12 In this case, the FTC charged
Beech-Nut with adopting and enforcing a system of price fixing agreements.
Beech-Nut appealed from a cease and desist order and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set the order aside," reasoning
that although it expressed its difficulty in seeing any difference between a
written agreement and a tacit understanding in their effect upon the re-
straint of trade, it, nevertheless, regarded the case as governed by the
0 Id. at 99-100.
10 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The United States Supreme Court held for the first time
that vertical agreements to maintain resale prices were illegal as a violation of the
Sherman Act.
11 Supra note 7, at 99.
12 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
13 Id. at 441.
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decision of the Supreme Court in Colgate. On appeal the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Colgate and Schrader both stood for the proposi-
tion that agreements to maintain resale prices were forbidden and further,
Schrader specifically held such agreements could be implied from a course
of dealing or other circumstances. The Court then found that Beech-Nut's
course of dealing amounted to an agreement with its buyers to maintain
resale prices. 14
The three cases just discussed clearly indicate that the Court was
concerned only with the question of whether the antitrust laws had been
violated. It is true that in all three opinions the Court mentioned that a
seller has the right to choose his own customers and that a trader could
simply refuse to sell to others as well as withhold his goods from those who
would not sell them at the price fixed for their resale. But, as is said by
the Court in Beech-Nut:
He may not, consistently with the [Sherman] act, go beyond the
exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations, express or
implied, unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of
commerce in the channels of interstate trade."
It is submitted that the above statement is another warning to the bar, just
as the language in Schrader could very well have been. It would seem that
the Court was informing all concerned that it was primarily interested in
determining if there was an antitrust violation and it would not tolerate
an avoidance of these laws under the guise of exercising the right to refuse
to deal.
The lower court opinions in both Schrader and Beech-Nut would
certainly indicate that both the bar and bench understood Colgate to mean
much more than the Supreme Court intended it to mean. It would seem
that the Beech-Nut opinion would have clarified these misconceptions; how-
ever, this was not the case and the courts and bar continued to rely on
Colgate. 16 It would serve no purpose to examine all the cases which dealt
with Colgate since this section is not intended to be a history of the doctrine;
it is however, intended to clarify the atmosphere surrounding Colgate. To
adequately complete such a task a brief discussion of the famous 1960
Parke, Davis" case is necessary.
The United States sought to enjoin Parke, Davis from conspiring and
combining, in violation of the Sherman Act, with retail and wholesale drug-
14 The conduct which the Court found amounted to an agreement consisted of:
(1) reporting to distributors the names of dealers who would not adhere to Beech-
Nut's pricing policy; (2) black listing non-adherers; (3) maintaining a special force
of agents to check on pricing policies of the sellers; (4) utilization of an elaborate sys-
tem of codes so that a price cutter's source would be easily ascertainable; (5) utiliza-
tion of any other equivalent cooperative means of accomplishing the maintenance of
prices fixed by the company. Id. at 456.
4. 16 Supra note 12, at 453.
16 An examination of Shepard's United States Citations, Case Edition 1943, and
Case Edition Supplement 1943-1964 will reveal that the Colgate case has been cited,
referred to, distinguished of dissented from at least 100 times since. Beech-Nut: was
deci ed. .
17 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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gists to maintain the wholesale and retail prices of Parke, Davis products.
The district court's dismissed the complaint at the close of the govern-
ment's presentation of evidence, on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the government had not shown a right to relief. According to the facts,
Parke, Davis in attempting to maintain resale prices stated its pricing
policy to its customers, but in addition sent agents around to its various
distributors instructing the latter not to sell to price-cutting retailers, and
further instructing that they would be cut off, not only if they sold below
cost, but also if they sold to any such retailers."
On these facts the district court held "the actions of [Parke, Davis]
... were properly unilateral and sanctioned by law under the doctrine laid
down in the [Colgate case]. . . 2,20
On a direct appeal the Supreme Court reversed. The Court, like its
predecessors in Schrader and Beech-Nut, again emphasized that in Colgate
the Court was bound by the district court's interpretation of the indictment
and by that interpretation an agreement to maintain prices was not found.
The Court then discussed Schrader and Beech-Nut, as well as other cases
in this area and held that Parke, Davis' conduct plainly exceeded the limi-
tations of the "Colgate doctrine."
Although Parke Davis' originally announced wholesaler's policy
would not under Colgate have violated the Sherman Act, if its action
thereunder was the simple refusal without more to deal with whole-
salers who did not observe the wholesalers' Net Price Selling Sched-
ule, that entire policy was tainted with the "vice of ... illegality"
... , when Parke Davis used it as the vehicle to gain the whole-
salers' participation in the program to effectuate the retailers' ad-
herence to the suggested retail prices.n
The obvious question after Parke, Davis was, did this case change the
law? It is submitted that the answer to this question is no. The Parke, Davis
Court had merely said what Colgate, Schrader, and Beech-Nut had said:
that a refusal to deal is no defense to a violation of the antitrust laws.
With the discussion of these four cases now complete, it would seem
that there really is no such thing as the "Colgate doctrine." All four cases
seem to be primarily interested in determining if there is a violation of the
antitrust laws. If there is no violation then, as Colgate points out, a person
may support a price maintenance policy, or any other policy for that matter,
by refusing to deal with non-adherers. On the other hand, as Schrader,
18 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958).
10 The facts further indicated that:
Representatives called contemporaneously upon the retailers involved, in-
dividually, and told each that if he did not observe the suggested minimum
retail prices, Parke Davis would refuse to deal with him, and that further- a
more he would be unable to purchase any Parke Davis products from the ur
wholesalers. Each of the retailers was also told that his competitors were
being similarly informed.
Supra note 17, at 33-34.
20 Supra note 18, at 829.
21 Supra note 17, at 45-46.
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Beech-Nut, and Parke, Davis points out, if there is a coercive program based
upon a refusal to deal to support an illegal policy then the seller is not
allowed to say he is merely exercising his right to choose his customers,
since the illegal policy itself is all the court needs in order to find a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. It is, therefore, a meaningless exercise to attempt
to distinguish the cases subsequent to Colgate; or, for that matter, to even
conclude that the "doctrine" has been distinguished away Such positions
assume that there was such a doctrine and that it was ever a viable defense
to an antitrust violation.
Having stated this proposition in general, the comment will, in its re-
mainder, apply it to the present state of the antitrust law. The variety of
marketing situations in which the refusal to deal is used has tended to spread
thin the Court's quick foreclosure of the "doctrine", and thus the Colgate cita-
tion is still present in numerous antitrust briefs.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The most appropriate place to begin a present day examination of
"refusals to deal" is in the area of resale price maintenance, inasmuch as the
Colgate case itself and the leading cases in which the doctrine has been
applied were cases involving resale price plans. Theoretically, there are two
ways in which a manufacturer may legally control resale prices: 22 (1) By
coming within the exceptions to the Sherman Act set forth in the Miller-
Tydings23 and McGuire Acts24 or, (2) By seeking compliance with his policy
among his customers by the use of the refusal to deal within the limits of
the "Colgate doctrine"; i.e., announcing in advance the prices at which he
wants his products resold and refusing to sell to customers who do not adhere
to this policy.
With an increasing number of states repealing the non-signer provisions
of their fair "trade laws, the effectiveness of resale price agreements under
these laws becomes questionable.25 Conversely, the use of refusals to deal
as a method of enforcing resale price plans becomes proportionally more
significant. The question then arises as to the practical use of refusals to deal
as a method of enforcement. Is the refusal to deal, within its legal limits, an
effective method of maintaining resale prices, and, as such, of importance to
manufacturers and their legal counsel, or is it just a legal concept of interest
only to scholars interested in the historical development of trade regulations?
22 Hanson, Maintaining Resale Price through Refusals to Deal: A Re-Examination,
2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 47 (1960).
23 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). This Act was passed as an amendment
to § 1 of the Sherman Act. It provided in general that agreements between manufac-
turers and retailers fixing the prices at which the retailer would sell, if legal under
state law, were exempt from the federal antitrust laws.
24 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958). Most state fair trade laws
provided that dealers with notice of a resale price agreement, even though not parties to
• the agreement, were bound not to sell below the price set by the contract. These so
called "non-signer" provisions were held not be covered by the Miller-Tydings exemp-
tion in the case of Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
The McGuire Act was enacted to include agreements made pursuant to such non-signer
provisions within the exemption.
25 Legislative Note, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev, 350, 359 (1964).
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It is the purpose of this section to examine the approach of today's courts
to "refusals to deal" as applied to resale price maintenance and to ascertain
its effectiveness as a means of controlling resale prices.
Resale price maintenance is the name given to a policy whereby the
supplier or manufacturer undertakes to set the price at which his product
is to be resold. He may do this for reasons of his own or under pressure from
distributors of his product. For whatever reasons, the end result is a reduction
or diminution of price competition among the distributors. One of the
purposes of the Sherman Act was to prevent the diminution of price compe-
tition and to effectuate this goal, both vertica126 as well as horizontal" price
fixing agreements have been held illega1. 28
Aside from price-fixing agreements under state fair trade laws, the
"Colgate doctrine" has been regarded, therefore, as an anomaly in the anti-
trust laws. 2° An undesirable economic result, namely the elimination of price
competition among competitors, if produced by a horizontal or vertical
agreement, would be struck down as illegal; yet, theoretically, the very
same result, if reached not by agreement but by a series of separate and
individual decisions to adhere to a manufacturer's prior announced price
maintenance policy, backed up by a refusal to sell to price-cutters,
would be tolerated 3 0 Instead of achieving compliance through collective
agreement, the same result may be achieved through effective coercion. For
this reason many commentators have urged that Colgate be overruled 91
It is submitted that there is nothing for the Supreme Court to overrule,
unless the Court wishes to rule that a businessman has no freedom to deal
with whomever he wants. However, it is not the businessman's freedom to
deal that the commentators are attacking, but his use of the right to attain
otherwise illegal purposes under the antitrust laws. For this very reason it
is unnecessary to withdraw this freedom as applied to resale price mainte-
nance plans because the refusal to deal, by itself, will not 'support and
effectuate such a plan. In order to have an effective resale price policy, it is
26 A vertical price fixing agreement is the name given to an agreement between
a manufacturer and a retailer which sets forth the price at which the retailer will re-
sell the manufacturer's product.
27 Horizontal price fixing is an agreement between competing retailers to sell
products at a uniform price.
28 E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., supra note 10 (verti-
cal agreement); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956)
(horizontal agreement).
28 Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1962).
88 This was recognized by the Supreme Court in Parke, Davis:
The Sherman Act forbids combinations of traders to suppress competition.
True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a prohibited
combination to suppress price competition if each customer, although induced
to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced policy, independently decides
to observe specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not overruled, this re-
sult is tolerated.. ..
Supra note 17, at 44.
81 See Judge Frank's dissent in Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distrib: Co.,
189 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1951); Barber, Refusals to Deal, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847
(1955); Turner, supra note 29; Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1121 (1949).
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submitted that more than a mere refusal to deal is necessary, and the courts,
opposed as they are to fixed resale prices, can almost always find some
action of the manufacturer, aside from the refusal to deal, to be violative
of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, if the manufacturer meticulously avoids
these collateral acts and relies solely on his refusal to deal, he is unable to
effectively maintain his price fixing policy.
The courts in attacking resale price plans will not look at the refusal to
deal, as such, but will place it into its business setting. If they can find an
agreement, or a contract, or a conspiracy between the manufacturer and
the retailers adhering to the resale prices, then they need look no further,
because these elements in and of themselves constitute violations of the
antitrust laws. 32 If these elements are not apparent from the facts of the
case, the court will look to other acts of the manufacturer, collateral to
the refusal to deal, but often used to support the threat of the refusal to
deal as a means of coercion. From these acts, taken as a whole, the court
will infer the necessary element of agreement. 33
The Seventh Circuit has taken. an even more radical approach to price-
fixing plans. In A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp.," without finding any
conspiracy or agreement, the court held a watch band manufacturer's uni-
lateral refusal to deal with a wholesaler who would not agree to maintain
minimum resale prices to be a violation of the antitrust laws. The whole-
saler, Becken, had instituted a treble damage suit 33 against Gemex, the
manufacturer, when the latter terminated the former's distributorship. The
lower court dismissed the action, but the court of appeals reversed on the
grounds that inasmuch as a resale price agreement is illegal, any refusal
to deal to further such a plan is also illegal. It reasoned:
A wrench can be used to turn bolts and nuts. It can also be used
to assault a person in a robbery. Like a wrench, a manufacturer's
right to stop selling to a wholesaler can be used legitimately; but it
may not be used to accomplish an unlawful purpose 23
Thus, the court did not look for an agreement or conspiracy between Gemex
and its distributors who resold at the stated prices, nor did it look to any
acts collateral to the refusal to deal and state that such acts are so coercive
as to infer a tacit agreement or combination among all who adhered to the
plan. Instead, it merely looked to the underlying purpose of the refusal to
deal. Finding the purpose to be unlawful the court could then condemn the
refusal to deal as a means of attaining that purpose." This reasoning, while
32 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
SS Such collateral acts might include: procuring agents to report price cutters,
keeping lists of price cutters, numbering packages in order to facilitate the determination
of price . cutters, or seeking assurances from customers that they will adhere to the
price plan or that they will report price cutters. See the cases discussed in section 1 of
the comment for fact situations involving these collateral acts.
34 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
85 The complaint alleged a violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
80 Supra note 34, at 3, 4.
ST The court, in effect, has made the resale price maintenance plan a substantive
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extreme, would seem to indicate that present day courts view a manu-
facturer's right to freely choose his customers as not only a restricted right
but also as one that may be forfeited in instances when the manufacturer
is pursuing a policy prohibited by the antitrust statutes.
Shortly after Parke, Davis, the court in George W. Warner & Co. v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co.38
 held that a distributor's complaint in a treble
damage suit brought against a manufacturer, 39 who refused to deal any
longer with him, stated facts sufficient to show an antitrust violation despite
the lack of any allegations of conspiracy or agreement. The complaint
alleged that the manufacturer in furtherance of a resale price maintenance
policy had threatened loss of distributorship, elimination or reduction of
price discounts, surveillance of bids, and the blacklisting of price cutters."
When the distributor disregarded the manufacturer's policy, his distributor-
ship was terminated. The lower court, finding no allegation of agreement,
dismissed the complaint."
The court of appeals, however, took the view that the alleged actions
collateral to the refusal to deal, if proven, were of such a coercive nature
that a combination in violation of the antitrust laws could be inferred among
all who adhered to the resale price policy. Relying heavily on the language
of Parke, Davis, the court reversed the lower court by stating:
[W]hen the manufacturer's actions go beyond mere announcement
of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other
means which effect adherence to his resale prices; then he has put
together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. 42
The court, realizing that a refusal to deal, by itself, will not support a
resale price maintenance plan, concluded that after Parke, Davis, "The Su-
preme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may
pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be
somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise."'"
The recent case of Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc." would
seem to suggest that situation of "Doric simplicity." American, a luggage
manufacturer, maintained a resale price policy by preticketing its products
with the suggested retail prices. Its salesmen advised all customers that
anyone who did not adhere to the preticketed prices would be dropped as
a customer. In an attempt to meticulously avoid any acts beyond this mere
announcement of its policy and a refusal to deal with price-cutters, the
manufacturer did not elicit any express agreements from its customers that
violation under § 1 without an agreement or conspiracy. The Supreme Court has yet
to accept this viewpoint. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
38 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
39 Black & Decker is the world's largest manufacturer of portable electric power
tools ordinarily used in building construction.
40 In an attempt to control minimum sales prices on bids by its distributors to
government agencies, Black & Decker allegedly issued this warning.
41 172 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
42 Supra note 38 at 790.
43 Ibid.
44 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
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they would maintain the resale prices nor did it have any formal method
of policing adherence to the policy.
Two large department stores in the Wilmington, Delaware area ad-
hered to the prices, but a discount retailer, Klein, sold the luggage below
the preticketed prices. Customers of the other two retailers complained
that the luggage could be bought in the area at a lower price. This complaint
was passed on to American's salesman, which, it is submitted, would be the
normal course of action in any practical business situation. Klein was warned
that his continued price cutting would result in a termination of his account
with American and when he still declined to adhere to American's policy,
the threat was exercised. Klein then brought a private antitrust suit against
American and the two department stores alleging an illegal price-fixing
conspiracy. 45
From these facts, the district court found an antitrust violation and
awarded treble damages to Klein.46 Relying on Parke, Davis, the court held
that American's methods exceeded the limits of permissibility defined by
Colgate47 and that the two retailers participated with him when they com-
plied with the prices established. The court was able to find a conspiracy by
inferring (1) a tacit agreement between American and the two department
stores who resold the luggage at the specified prices, and finding as a fact
that (2) the stores assisted American in "ferreting out" price cutters.
On appeal the decision was reversed on the basis that the lower court's
findings of the above-mentioned facts were "clearly erroneous." 48 It should
be noted that the court of appeals scarcely mentioned the refusal to deal,
but instead turned its attention to the collateral facts. Upon finding that
the facts did not constitute an antitrust violation, it was unnecessary to
discuss the refusal to deal. Thus it can be seen that a manufacturer who
scrupulously avoids any acts collateral to his refusal to deal may frustrate
a court's attempt to find an illegal course of dealings. Nevertheless, although
the manufacturer may be able to avoid legal liability by using just the
"refusal to deal," the question still remains whether the "refusal to deal"
by itself is a practical method of enforcing resale price plans.
In the Klein case, the fact that a private suit was instituted and suc-
cessfully prosecuted in the lower court cannot be overlooked and must be
emphatically underscored. Furthermore, it should be noted that American
geared its resale price to reflect the normal "mark-up" of the two large de-
45 A violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act was alleged, supra note 35.
46 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962), noted 4 B. C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 180 (1962);
62 Colum. L. Rev. 1505 (1962).
47 The district court felt that American solicited assurance from new customers
that the preticketed price would be observed; and in those instances where it didn't
seek an express assurance, the customer was deluged with literature emphasizing the
necessity of compliance and the sanction of refusing to deal with price cutters. From
these collateral acts, the court was able to infer a tacit agreement on the part of all
complying customers.
48 Supra note 44, at 790. The court could find no evidence establishing the col-
lateral acts which the lower court relied on It stated, "All that the evidence established
was that prospective retailers were 'advised' of American's price maintenance policy,
and its expectation that those to whom it sold its lines would not sell below pre-
ticketed prices." Id. at 790-91.
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partment stores who were joined as defendants. So their adherence to the
preticketed prices was based more on self-interest than on American's threat
to discontinue business with price cutters. Klein, a discount merchant, did not
need to resell with such a large profit margin because he did not have the
overhead costs of the larger department stores. He, accordingly, rejected
American's proposed resale price and sold the products at a lower price.
Thus it seems clear that the coercive threat of the refusal to deal had little
effect on a retailer's decision to adhere or to reject American's prices.
From the reactions of the three retailers to American's price main-
tenance policy, it is submitted that, in general, a resale price policy can only
be maintained by gearing the policy to satisfy the self-interests of the re-
tailers. If the self-interests of the retailers is not sufficiently reflected in the
policy and they refuse to adhere, a refusal to deal on the part of the manu-
facturer to bring them into line is more likely to result in a private antitrust
suit, rather than adherence, by the rejected retailer.
In conclusion, the "Colgate doctrine" may be used legally but cannot be
used practically to maintain resale prices. If a manufacturer attempts to use
the refusal to deal in furtherance of such a plan, the courts can and usually
will find some measures added to the simple refusal to deal which the manu-
facturer has carried out in order to coerce possible price-cutters. The court
can then find in these added measures a degree of agreement from which
it can infer a combination or conspiracy among all parties who adhere to
the resale price plan. Furthermore, as in the Klein case, if the manufacturer
does escape liability, his course of conduct will still be susceptible to careful
scrutinization by the courts and any use of a refusal to deal to punish a price-
cutter is an open invitation to protracted and expensive litigation. As such,
it is more of a liability than a protected "right" and a businessman should
think twice before using the refusal to deal—and then reject such a policy as
a bad business risk I
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
While the courts admit that in theory, at least, a seller may maintain
resale prices by refusals to deal, it has been shown that this result is rarely
reached as a practical matter. In such cases the courts look at the sur-
rounding circumstances rather than the refusal to deal itself and in most
situations find that such circumstances and coercive conduct amount to an
illegal arrangement to maintain resale prices. When dealing with tying
arrangements" the courts seem to be more interested in the refusal to deal
itself since in reality it is actually part of the tying arrangement and, thereby,
impossible to separate from the actual violation. Because the coercive nature
of the refusal to deal is so essential to the tying agreement, whatever "right"
Colgate may have afforded is now merged into the determination of the
presence of the tying agreement. This section of the comment will explore
49 A tying arrangement for purposes of this section may best be described by use
of a hypothetical situation. Assume X manufactures flashlights and batteries and will
not sell the flashlights unless the buyer agrees to. purchase the batteries. In essence X
has set up a tying arrangement with the flashlights the tying product and the batteries
the tied product.
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the manner and effect of this submersion of the "right" into the entire
fact circumstance.
As a starting point, it is necessary to show what is illegal about a
tying arrangement. This may be done by reading the following statement
made by the Supreme Court.
By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of an-
other, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judg-
ment as to the "tied" products' merits and insulates it from the com-
petitive stresses of the open market. But any intrinsic superiority
of the "tied" product would convince freely choosing buyers to select
it over others, anyway. Thus " [i] n the usual case only the prospect
of reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt such a
contract and only his control of the supply of the tying device,
whether conferred by patent monopoly or otherwise obtained, could
induce a buyer to enter one.""
It is apparent from the above that the courts take a dim view of tying
arrangements and they are properly classified as illegal per se 61
Since a tying arrangement is illegal per se, it would seem that no further
discussion is necessary. This is not true however, since three questions are
raised which require analysis: (I) Will the refusal to deal be considered as
a defense to a tying arrangement? (2) Does a simple refusal to deal become
illegal when it is used to coerce a buyer into adhering to a tying agreement?
(3) Assuming there is a tying arrangement, will the refusal to deal give rise
to damages?
In dealing with question one, a discussion of Times-Picayune v. United
States52 should prove helpful. The Times-Picayune was the only morning
paper in New Orleans. It also published an evening edition, and here it had
a competitor. The paper re/used to sell advertising space in its morning
edition unless advertisers purchased space in its evening edition as well. The
United States brought a civil suit under the Sherman Act challenging the
use of these "unit" contracts as an unreasonable restraint of trade and as
an attempt to monopolize trade. The district court found violations and
entered a decree enjoining the use of these "unit" contracts. The Supreme
Court reversed and held that a tying contract is illegal per se when a seller
has a monopoly in the tying product and when a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied product is thus restrained. But it concluded that
Times-Picayune had no monopoly. This conclusion was reached by defining
the market to include all three dailies instead of separating the morning and
evening markets and recognizing the Times-Picayune monopoly in the
morning field.
It is apparent that the sole issue before the Court was, did Times-
Picayune have a monopoly or sufficient market control over the morning
newspaper business so that its "unit" contracts could properly be labeled a
5° Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
51 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 258-60 (1963).
62 Supra note 50.
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tying arrangement. The Court did not concern itself with any such thing
as the "Colgate doctrine" or a refusal to deal as a defense to antitrust viola-
tions. The Court did mention refusal to deal but almost by way of an-
nouncing that a refusal to deal itself could become an antitrust violation.
As the Court said:
Refusals to sell, without more, do not violate the law . . . [But]
if accompanied by unlawful conduct or agreement, or conceived
in monopolistic purpose or market control, even individual sellers'
refusals to deal have transgressed the [Sherman] Act." (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is submitted that Times-Picayune illustrates two points: (1) that the
"Colgate doctrine" in no way affects the adjudication of the presence of a
tying agreement; (2) the great risk a seller takes by attempting to enforce
a tying arrangement by threatening the buyer with a refusal to deal. As
to the latter, if the refusal to deal was carried out and the buyer brought
a suit for treble damages, the buyer would merely have to prove there was
a tying arrangement and it would be of no avail for the seller to claim he
was merely refusing to deal and was within his rights in so refusing.
If the dictum in Times-Picayune is to become a formulated policy,
then it is possible to see that in certain instances the "right to refuse to deal"
has now become the basis for a separate cause of action—a result completely
opposite to the "Colgate doctrine." In Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co. 54
 the court seems to indicate the refusal to deal causes such
a result. Englander, a Ford dealer, was required by Ford to sell only
Ford parts and he was told that his dealership would be terminated if
he did not adhere to this policy. Ford retained a short notice cancellation
clause in its dealership agreement. Englander in a treble damage suit
alleged that Ford's threats to exercise this clause forced him to sell his
dealership to a Ford designee and as a result of such sale he suffered a loss.
The court of appeals, in reversing the trial court's dismissal, said:
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with a short notice cancellation
provision unless by its exercise Ford was able to coerce violations,
and by its use had forced Englander to sell its business ... but ...
the use of a short term cancellation provision for the purpose of
violating the law is itself a violation of the anti-trust law 65
The Englander case is significant inasmuch as the court did not believe it
necessary to first find the tying agreement before assessing damages for the
refusal to deal The court seemed impressed by the inherently coercive power
of the refusal to deal being used for a purpose which could be considered
illegal. It is interesting to note that the court used the refusal to deal itself
in much the same manner the Supreme Court in Parke, Davis" and Beech-
53 Id. at 625.
64 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
55 Id. at 15.
56 Supra note 17.
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Nut" looked at the seller's conduct in order to find the antitrust violation.
Thus it can be said that in handling an attempt to monopolize—as a tying
agreement is—the court may view the refusal to deal as the element that
proves the attempt. In this circumstance, the claimed protection of Colgate
is at best an empty gesture.
The total uselessness of the "Colgate doctrine" can be seen when used
as a defense where, being guilty of a tying arrangement, the refusal to deal
is claimed as a means of mitigating damages.
In Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co." the court on a previous appeal found
a tying arrangement and the present appeal was to determine the damages
which resulted. The tying arrangement consisted in Sinclair's requiring its
dealers to sell Goodyear tires, batteries, and accessories in addition to
Sinclair products as a condition to holding a franchise. Osborn, a Sinclair
dealer, had his dealership terminated when it came time for renewal, because
he did not sell enough of the Goodyear products. Osborn brought a treble
damage suit for the loss he sustained resulting from this tying arrangement
and the district court found his damages were limited to three times the differ-
ence in cost between the Goodyear products and others which could have
been purchased at a lower cost. Osborn appealed claiming his damages
also included the loss of profits resulting from the termination of the dealer-
ship agreement. The court of appeals in reversing the district court said:
The defense predicated upon Colgate, that a seller having a policy
of resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, tie-in sales, etc.,
nevertheless has a qualified right to deal with whomever he wishes,
is material to the question of whether the seller has put together
an arrangement in violation of the antitrust laws. This defense
of freedom to select one's customers is also relevant to the issue
whether a particular refusal to deal was in furtherance of an un-
lawful arrangement or whether it was instead motivated by other
considerations. However, the defense had no bearing on the issue
of recoverable damages stemming from a refusal to deal which was
part and parcel of an antitrust violation."
The Osborn case looks beyond the actual tying arrangement and holds that
the refusal to deal, which standing alone would be permissible, has now
become illegal since "damages may be recovered for a refusal to deal in
furtherance of an arrangement condemned by the antitrust laws. . . .' 360
In the present case Sinclair had a contractual right to terminate the lease
when it did and it thus argued that this termination was perfectly valid.
The court in rejecting this defense pointed out in a footnote:
Nor would it be a defense to Sinclair that it had a contractual right,
under the written lease and written sales agreement, to terminate
the relationship on May 31, 1956. A refusal to deal based upon a
57 Supra note 12.
58 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
59 Id. at 574.
55 Id. at 574-75.
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contract provision is, in respect to the antitrust laws, no different
from the right of traders generally to select their customers. In
either case, the right is limited to situations where the seller has
not put together an arrangement in restraint of trade."
It may thus be seen that in the area of tying arrangements, not only
has the "Colgate doctrine" never supported a relevant defense, but, as both
Englander and Osborn point out, the "right" may have become a liability.
Not only is the "right" lost in a tying arrangement, the refusal to deal
becomes tainted with illegality itself when it is used to further an antitrust
violation.
EXCLUSIVE DEALERSHIPS
Sometimes a manufacturer terminates an exclusive dealership at the
insistence of another of his exclusive dealers, or replaces one such dealer
with another. By the very nature of this type of agreement any disruption
brings strong reactions. If the terminated dealer brings a private antitrust
suit against the manufacturer, the latter almost invariably raises the so-called
"Colgate rule" as a defense. In a recent case of this type,° 2
 it is stated,
"[Defendants] argue that the Colgate rule has been repeatedly applied to
uphold a seller's independent refusal to continue to deal with an exclusive
distributor whose policies are not to the seller's liking."" From a cursory
glance at this statement and the cases which were cited to uphold this propo-
sition," it would appear that the "Colgate rule" actually does afford a
special immunity to the antitrust laws and is being used quite successfully
to uphold otherwise illegal courses of conduct in this area. Relying on this
mistaken belief, the antitrust bar continues to cite Colgate as a defense to
antitrust suits. It is the purpose of this section to show that in cases involving
exclusive dealerships, the seller's refusal to deal is upheld, not because of any
special immunity offerd by Colgate, but simply because his course of con-
duct, with which the "refusal to deal" was associated, was quite legal from
the outset.
When a seller induces a distributor to handle only his line of products
and to desist from handling any of his rival's lines, he has created an ex-
clusive dealership. Although these dealerships may block off competing
products from the buying public, there are many sound business consid-
erations which justify these arrangements." Therefore, exclusive dealings
are not per se violations of the antitrust laws, but only become so when
61 Id. at 575.
62 Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp.
784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
63 Id. at 786.
es Several of the cases cited are discussed in this section, infra.
66 With an exclusive dealer, the manufacturer can be assured that the distributor
can devote full time to the sale of his goods. Furthermore, by not carrying other lines,
the distributor is less apt to overextend his financial commitments, and his requirements
from the manufacturer will tend to fluctuate less than if he were carrying an excessive
inventory. This, in turn, would lower the manufacturer's operating costs because the
manufacturer could schedule his output more efficiently every month. These are but
a few of the advantages to such arrangements.
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likely to "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.""
The exclusive dealer, by the very nature of his arrangement, does not carry
competing lines Thus, when the manufacturer terminates such a dealership,
he essentially puts the dealer out of business. It is submitted, however, that
when the manufacturer's conduct is upheld, it is because there is no violation
of the antitrust statutes, and not because he used , the "Colgate rule" to
characterize as legal, an otherwise illegal act.
The holding in Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.° 7 expresses
the proper function of Colgate:
Every manufacturer has a natural and complete monopoly of
his particular product .... If he is engaged in a private business,
he is free to exploit this monopoly by selling his product directly to
the ultimate consumer or through one or more distributors or
dealers, as he may deem most profitable to him. If he chooses the
latter method, he may exercise his own independent discretion as to
the parties with whom he will deal . . . [and] a refusal to deal be-
comes illegal only when it produces an unreasonable restraint of
trade or a monopoly forbidden by the antitrust laws.° 8 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Schwing, an automobile dealer whose dealership with Hudson was termi-
nated in favor of another dealer brought a treble damage suit against Hudson
and the dealer alleging a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws.
Inasmuch as the court could find no allegation that the replacement of one
dealer by another was done in an effort to extend the manufacturer's natural
monopoly of its own product, or to drive out the products of competitors,
it could find no allegation of illegal conduct. Without this illegal conduct
to color the refusal to deal, the court dismissed the complaint. In its treat-
ment of the case, the court focuses not on the manner in which a refusal
to deal produces the monopoly, but only on the existence of the monopoly.
Upon this existence the refusal to deal becomes thereby actionable; without
this existence, recital of a "Colgate doctrine" is totally unnecessary.
This latter point may be further illustrated by Packard Motor Car Co.
v. Webster Motor Car Co."On a fact situation almost identical to that in
Schwing, the lower court found a termination by Packard of Webster's
automobile dealership in favor of another dealer, Zell, to be illegal. It based
the decision on the fact that the termination was in furtherance of an agree-
ment between Packard and Zell to eliminate a competitor of Zell." The
e6 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 4 14 (1958). Section 3 of the Clayton Act covers
both exclusive dealing and tying arrangements.
07 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd on opinion below, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
68 138 F. Supp. 899, 902-03 (1956).
69 245 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
70 Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C.
1955). Whereas the court in Schwing held that an agreement between two parties to
exclude another from trade is only illegal if the agreement is a horizontal one (between
competitors) or, if the manufacturer dominates the market, this court found the agree-
ment, though vertical, to be illegal by stating:
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court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the agreement was not aimed
at eliminating Packard's competitors but only at reducing competition among
Packard's own dealers. It stated, "Since there are other cars 'reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes' as Packard cars . an
exclusive contract for marketing Packards does not create a monopoly." 71
By so holding that the agreement between Zell and Packard was legal, the
court could not condemn a "refusal to deal" in furtherance of a reasonable
and legal restraint of trade."
From both these cases it can be seen that the courts tend to view an
exclusive dealer as merely an agent distributing the manufacturer's products
at the consumer level. Using this approach to the dealer cases, the courts
feel that if a manufacturer wants to replace one "agent" by another, or
reduce the number of his "agents" in a given consumer area, he may freely
do so because such conduct affects only his own products. The antitrust laws
were not intended to regulate policies of a manufacturer which concern his
own product or "agents," and it is only when his policies have an effect on
the marketing of rival products that a violation of the statutes occur. Con-
sequently, unless the terminated dealer who brings a private antitrust suit
can prove that the termination of his dealership has such an effect, his
cause of action will fail."
This reasoning was applied recently in Ace Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn,
Inc. 74 In that case, Ace, an exclusive beer distributor, sued the brewery
company and Kohn after its distributorship was terminated in favor of Kohn.
The complaint alleged a conspiracy between Kohn and the brewery company
to destroy Ace's business and to set Kohn up as the new distributor. The
lower court, relying on Packard and Schwing, dismissed the action on the
basis that such an agreement did not violate the Sherman Act. The court
of appeals approved, stating:
The fact that a refusal to deal with a particular buyer without
more, may have an adverse effect upon the buyer's business does
The right to select one's customers is a right that may be exercised free from
compulsion and without agreements with others that tend unreasonably to
restrain interstate commerce or to create a monopoly. Such a choice may
not legally result from an agreement or arrangement or conspiracy between
two or more individuals, or two or more business concerns, to exclude others
from the channels of trade, or to attempt to create a monopoly or substantial
monopoly for one of the parties to the agreement.
Id at 8.
71 Supra note 69, at 420.
72
 Essentially the court was upholding the agreement because it was a vertical one
between non-competitors. Cf., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963),
noted, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 185 (1963).
73 [Pjrivate antitrust damage suits by buyers cut off from supplies for failure
to adhere to the sellers' distribution policy have uniformly failed, perhaps due
to the recognition that Section 3 of the Clayton Act is fundamentally de-
signed to protect the seller's competitors from being foreclosed from the mar-
ket—an objective which need not comprehend safeguarding an individual
buyer incidentally prejudiced by the seller's refusal to deal.
The Att'y Gen.'s Nat. Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955) at 136, n.28.
74 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963).
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not make the refusal to deal a violation .... Unless it can be said
that the refusal to deal with plaintiff had the result of suppressing
competition and thus constituted "restraint of trade" within the
meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, there is no violation of
the Act."
The court concluded, "We do not think that the substitution . . . of one
distributor for another had this result."76 So again it can be seen that the
"refusal to deal" was upheld because the plaintiff was unable to prove that
the purpose with which it was associated was an illegal one.
In all these cases it may be noted that an exclusive dealership was
terminated, not simply at the whim of the manufacturer, but at the insistence
and urging of a third party who either desired the dealership himself or
wished by the termination to eliminate a competitor. Yet the court in
each instance found no violation because the agreement between the manu-
facturer and the dealer was in form a vertical one, and such agreements are
tolerated under the antitrust laws." When, however, the plaintiff alleges
that his dealership was terminated at the request of several competing dealers,
he has alleged a horizontal conspiracy, and the court can now find a violation
of the statutes.
Such a case may be illustrated by the recent decision of Walker Distrib.
Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co." There the distributor, Walker, alleged
that the brewery company and its other distributors conspired to terminate
Walker's dealership. The claim was dismissed by the lower court and on
appeal the brewery company cited Colgate to defend the termination of its
dealership with Walker. Declaring that exclusive dealerships are not illegal
per se and that a manufacturer can terminate such a dealership, the court
nevertheless felt that if there were a horizontal understanding among the
distributors to eliminate one of their competitors, such a conspiracy would
be illegal. Furthermore, it declared that inasmuch as the brewery company's
termination was the result of this conspiracy, it could not rely on Colgate
to uphold its action. The case was then remanded to determine whether a
horizontal agreement did, in fact, exist. Clearly this case demonstrates that
the "Colgate rule" never upholds an otherwise illegal course of conduct.
Whereas in the previous cases the terminated dealer was unable to show
some violation of the Sherman Act, and consequently the courts had no need
to apply any "Colgate doctrine" in this case the plaintiff did allege a course
of conduct which did violate the antitrust laws, and subsequently the
court could denounce the termination of the dealership, but again without
applying Colgate.
In conclusion, although the "Colgate doctrine" has been discussed by
the courts in cases involving exclusive dealing, it has not been the basis on
which terminations of such distributorships have been upheld. Rather, the
75 Id. at 287.
70 Ibid.
77 But see the opinion of the lower court in the Packard case, supra note 70 and
the dissenting opinion of Bazelon, J. in the court of appeals decision, supra note 69;
cf., White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 72.
78 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963).
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basis of these decisions has been a reliance on the nature of the dealership
itself, and until this distinction is realized by the antitrust bar, lawyers will
continue to rely erroneously on Colgate as a defense to antitrust violations.
DETERRING ANTITRUST SUITS BY REFUSALS TO DEAL
In the previous sections of this comment, refusals to deal have been
examined as being one element of the antitrust violation, usually as a method
used to enforce compliance with a pattern of restraint of trade. The courts
when dealing with cases involving these refusals to deal did so by determining
first if there was an antitrust violation. The present section will examine
a refusal to deal in 
who
 following fact situation: A commits an antitrust
violation against B  then commences a private antitrust suit against A.
As a result of this suit A refuses to deal with B. It is the purpose of this
section to examine the refusal to deal used as a deterrent to antitrust prose-
cutions in order to determine if it is there permissible and if so, what effects
it could have on private antitrust suits.
House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co." dealt with a fact
situation much like the above mentioned hypothetical. In a prior suits°
brought by the FTC, the Supreme Court found that Simplicity had violated
the antitrust laws. Relying on this outcome, House of Materials and other
customers brought a treble damage action against Simplicity. After this
suit was commenced, Simplicity notified House of Materials and the other
plaintiffs that when their present contract expired it would not be renewed.
House of Materials sought a preliminary injunction against Simplicity en-
joining this refusal to deal. The district courts' found that the sole motiva-
tion for Simplicity's refusal to deal with the plaintiffs was its desire to
retaliate for the treble damage action brought against it by them. The
court held this refusal to deal was itself a violation of the antitrust laws
and granted the injunction. On appeal, the court of appeals in reversing held
that Simplicity's action did not go beyond a simple refusal to deal which
is permissible under Colgate. In its opinion the court examined the refusal
to deal in order to determine whether it has brought about a violation of the
antitrust laws and concluded that it had not. "There is no suggestion here
that Simplicity's action constituted a violation of the anti-monopoly pro-
vision of the Sherman Act. . . . Moreover, we think it too plain to merit
discussion that Simplicity's 'refusal to deal' cannot be regarded as a violation
of the Clayton Act."82 The court in reaching its decision realized that the
"practical effect of Simplicity's conduct was to exert pressure on . . . [the
plaintiffs] . . . to acquiesce to Simplicity's desire that it discontinue the
lawsuit,"83 but as shown above the court found that this coercion alone was
no antitrust violation and thus the court could not issue an injunction under
the Clayton Act 84 The court then held that while the district court in ap-
79 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
80 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S . 55 (1959).
81 P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
82 Supra note 79, at 871.
88 Id. at 870.
84 § 16 Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958),.provides:
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propriate cases might restrain a defendant from attempting to coerce a plain-
tiff into discontinuing a lawsuit, in the present case such a result would
not be warranted since Simplicity's action did not violate any contractual
or other legal right of House of Materials.
In Simplicity, the court was not faced with the same refusals to deal
as were discussed in the previous sections. Here the court was dealing with
a refusal to deal which was not connected with an antitrust violation. The
refusal to deal in the present case, on the other hand, was under examination
as a separate entity, apart from any attempt to restrain trade, and looked
at in this light, the court held it did not itself constitute an antitrust viola-
tion. It is submitted that the court was correct in so holding since, as the
court points out, there was nothing in the antitrust laws which made a
refusal to deal a violation. The result although supportable may have an
adverse effect on private antitrust suits. In the present case the court pointed
out by way of background that Simplicity was by far the largest pattern
maker in the country and any store which dealt in women's dress patterns
would not be able to compete if it did not carry the Simplicity line. It may
thus be seen that a small dealer would, in the future, be -very wary of
bringing a private antitrust suit against such a large supplier as Simplicity.
For in doing so, he would be placing himself in a postion to be legally
forced out of business by the supplier's refusal to deal with him after the
suit was commenced. In reality, Simplicity or any large supplier would, by
exercising its right to refuse to deal one or two times, be insuring itself from
any further private antitrust suits. Certainly a small retailer would look at
the prior refusals to deal as a warning that if he brought a private antitrust
suit he too could have his supply stopped.
The third circuit reached a different result when faced with the same
basic fact situation as Simplicity. In Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis &
Co.,85 Bergen, a drug wholesaler, brought an antitrust action against Parke,
Davis and shortly after the suit was commenced Parke, Davis notified Bergen
that, effective immediately, its account was being permanently closed.
Bergen sought a temporary injunction pending litigation of the antitrust
suit enjoining Parke, Davis from cancelling Bergen's account. The district
court denied the injunction, concluding that there existed no statutory or
other legal basis for granting it." The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded with directions to grant the preliminary injunction. The court con-
ceded that the refusal to deal was not an antitrust violation, but held that
the district court as a court of equity did possess power to issue the pre-
liminary injunction. The court seemed to achieve this conclusion by finding
first, that the refusal to deal was, as Parke, Davis admitted, actuated either
by a feeling of resentment or dissapproval because of the initiation of the
antitrust action. Second, this refusal to deal had the effect of stifling the
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over
the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
85 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
56 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,151 (D.N.J.).
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main action. The court in holding that the refusal to deal would hamper the
principal suit, accepted Bergen's contention that such conduct would deter
the obtaining of witnesses to testify in the plaintiff's behalf since the wit-
nesses would fear that they would in turn also be cut off in retaliation for
their testifying.
The court also seemed to rely on the adverse effect that this refusal to
deal would generally have on private antitrust suits, as well as the irreperable
harm it would have on Bergen. The court said in conclusion:
The inconveniences, if any, that defendant will undergo if called
on to continue to deal with plaintiff are slight, while those that the
plaintiff has and will experience in the future are burdensome. 87
The result reached in Bergen seems to be equitable and proper since,
as the court points out, neither party is harmed by it. The question that
must be answered is, was the court's order supported in law? In essence the
court forced two parties to continue to deal where there was no legal
obligation to do so. It would certainly appear that Parke, Davis has lost
one of its basic rights, namely, the freedom to contract, but of course it
could be argued that such a right must step aside when it conflicts with a
public policy as strong as that which allows private antitrust suits.
As a result of Simplicity and Bergen it would seem apparent that no
fixed conclusion may be drawn as to the use of a refusal to deal as a method
of coercing a private antitrust plaintiff from continuing his suit. The
Simplicity case on one hand refuses to enjoin the refusal to deal even though
the court was aware of the adverse effect such a result would have on the
private antitrust suit. On the other hand the Bergen court enjoined the
refusal to deal even though it had to rely on its basic equity power to do
so. Both cases are supportable, one in law, the other in equity. Nevertheless
it would seem that the Bergen result is the most desirable since it protects
the antitrust litigant and furthermore seems to be more in line with the
courts dislike of refusals to deal which have an adverse effect on the enforce-
ment of antitrust laws. In view of the growing list of decisions where the
right to refuse to deal vanishes upon proof of an antitrust violation, 88 the
Bergen result seems fully justifiable. There is truly no reason to condemn
a refusal to deal when used to produce the antitrust violation,89 and yet
permit this refusal when used to protect the violation from prosecution. If
this so-called "right" can become tainted with illegality of which it was
a part," in a like manner it must share the illegality of the conduct it seeks
to harbor.
SUMMATION
In concluding, the following may be said•
(1) The so-called "Colgate doctrine" is in reality a myth which evolved
from a gross misunderstanding of the Colgate case
87 Supra note 85, at 728.
88
 A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 926 (1960).
89
 Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 54.
9° Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra note 58.
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(2) A refusal to deal, as a practical matter, is at most a very limited
right and courts are very reluctant to allow it to be used to
circumvent the object of the antitrust laws.
(3) The courts are primarily interested in determining if there is an
antitrust violation and thereby do not focus upon the refusal to
deal itself but upon that conduct which substantiates the antitrust
violation.
(4) A refusal to deal may actually merge with the conduct constituting
an antitrust violation and thus itself give rise to a damages award.
(5) The refusal to deal is a viable issue only when it is independently
used, i.e., when it is not a part of a marketing arrangement pro-
gram. The treatment that a court gives to such independent situa-
tions will much depend upon what reaction it has to the presence
of any inequitable coercive results.
EDWARD M. BLOOM
BURTON M. HARRIS
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